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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant, City of Preston, agrees with Plaintiffs statement of the case. In addition 
thereto, following the decision by the district court, the Defendant City of Preston filed a Motion for 
Costs and Attorney Fees supported by its Memorandum with a detailed listing of those fees. The 
court subsequently ruled that the City was the prevailing party, awarded the City its costs, but denied 
it attorney fees. The City filed a Cross-Appeal on the denial of the attorney fees. The City has 
illcorporaled its brief on Cross-Appeal together with its Respondent's Brief, 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. BECKSTEAD FAILED TO NVOKE ORDNANCE NO. 16.28.030B 
11. THE CITY HAS NOT BEEN UNJUSTLY ENRICHED 
III. BECKSTEAD FAILED TO TIMELY FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM 
IV. THE LETTER OF OCTOBER 22,2004, DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A CLAIM 
PURSUANT TO 56-907, IDAHO CODE 
V. THE CITY WAS MISLED TO ITS NSURY'BY BECKSTEAD'S FAILURE TO 
INVOICE THE ORDINANCE OR TO TIMELY SUBMIT A CLAIM. 
VI. THE CITY SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS ATTORNEY FEES AND cosrs 
ON APPEAL PURSUANT TO 5512-1 17, 12-120, AND 12-121, IDAHO CODE 
ISSUES ON CROSS-APPEAL 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING AN AWARD TO THE CITY 
OF ITS ATTORNEY FEES 
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ARGUMENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
I .  The Appellant (hereinafter referred to as "Beckstead") is a real estate developer. The 
Respondent is the City of Preston, Idaho (hereinafter referred to as "City"). In July, 2002, Beckstead 
submitted a plat to the City for approval of the Creamery Hollow Estates Subdivision (hereinafter 
referred to as "Subdivision") consisting of twenty-two lots. (73, Beckstead Affidavit, R. Val. 1, 
p.101; 75, Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen, R. Val. 1, p. 175). 
2. City ordinance required Beckstead to connect the Subdivision to a six inch diameter 
waterline. (73, Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn, R. Val. 2, p. 201). 
3. While a six inch water main was available to which Becltstead could connect, Darrell 
Wilburn, City Engineer, determined that the existing six inch line was connected to a four inch line 
which would create a restriction in flow to the Subdivision. The Fire Marshall for the Franklin 
County Fire District, a governmental entity separate and distinct froin the City, advised the City that 
the District would not approve the connection unless the line were six inches in diameter for its 
entire distance as the line would not provide adequate fire flow to the Subdivision if the four inch 
restriction were allowed to remain in place. This requirement was imposed by the Franklin County 
Fire District and not the City. (72-3, Second Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn, R. Val. 2, p. 233). 
4. Beckstead had three options for connection to the City water main: 
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A. He could wait until the City completed its ten inch waterloop 
project. 
B. He could replace 1,000 feet of four inch line on Oneida Street, or 
C. He could replace 1,700 feet of four inch line on 800 East Street. 
Beckstead chose option C, the replacement of 1,700 feet of four inch line on 800 East Street, 
although this option required the construction of an additional 700 feet of six inch line. The 
Subdivision's twenty-two lots benefited hom the construction of the waterline as Beclcstead could 
not have received Fire District approval without having constructed the same. (14-5, Affidavit of 
Darrell Wilbum, R. Vol. 2, pp. 201-202; and14-5, Second Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn, R. Vol. 2, 
p. 234). 
5. The City had the right to require Beckstead to increase the diameter of the 
line ("oversize") but if it did so, the City was then required to reimburse Beckstead for the 
oversizing. The City required Beckstead to construct a twelve inch diameter line rather than a six 
inch diameter line. (16-7, Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen, R. Vol. 1, p.'l75). 
6. The final plat for the Subdivision was approved by the City in July, 2003, and 
Beclcstead installed the waterline on 800 East Street in October, 2003. (IS, 10, Affidavit of Jerry C. 
Larsen, R. Vol. 1, p. 175). Beckstead was fully aware of his costs of construction by November 10, 
2003. (75 and Ex. C-1 - C-3, Affidavit of Clyde G. Nelson, R. Vol. 2, p. 208) 
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7. Following construction and as the City had required Beclcstead to oversize the line, 
Darrell Wilburn, City Engineer and Scott Martin computed the amount to be reimbursed to 
Beckstead for the oversizing. This amount was $7,461.00. Wilburn and Martin computed these 
figures on November 12,2003, and Beckstead was notified to file a claim against the City for said 
sum, which claim was filed on December 16, 2003. Beclcstead was reimbursed $7,461.00 on 
December 17,2003. (78, and Ex. A to Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn, R. Vol. 2, pp. 202,204; 78, and 
Ex. B, C to Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen, R. Vol. 1, pp. 175, 181, 182). Exhibit A to Darrell 
Witburn's Affidavit was solely prepared by Wilburn and Martin based upon the City's estimate of 
costs for six inch and twelve inch pipe. 
8. The City charges connection fees for hookups to a City watermain in the sum of 
$2,500.00 per connection. These fees are to reimburse the City for its costs in making the 
connection. The cost to the City for each connection in 2004 was $2,618.07. The present cost is 
approximately $3,349.00. The City's connection fee from 2003 to the present has remained at 
$2,500.00 for each connection. (712, Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen, R. Vol. 1, p. 176; 114 and Ex. B 
to Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn, R. Vol. 1, pp. 202, 205,206.) 
9. There have been five intervening connections made to the waterline installed by 
Beckstead since October, 2003. Fees for four of those connections were paid on September 29, 
2004. The fee for the remaining connection was paid on October 19,2004. All fees were paid prior 
to Beckstead's letter of October 22, 2004, and prior to the City being made aware that Beclcstead 
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might be claiming some form of reimbursement. For the five intervening connections made to the 
waterline constructed by Beckstead, the first four connections were made on October 19,2004, the 
fast one was made on November 16, 2004. No &ifher fees have been received by the City for 
connections made to the waterline installed by Beckstead (710,ll and Ex. D, E, to Afidavit of Jerry 
C. Larsen, R. Vol. 1, pp. 175, 183, 184-186). Thus, all fees had been paid to the City for its costs 
in making connections on behalf of residents of the colnmunity prior to receiving any 
communication from Beckstead that he might be interested in reimbursement. 
10. Beckstead did not colninunicate with the City about reimbursement of his costs for 
constructing the line until October, 22,2004. On that date Beckstead sent a letter to the City citing 
Section 16.28.030B of the Preston Municipal Code asking to meet with the City "to discuss the 
process of such reimbursement", and advised the City ihat he was aware "that several water 
connections had been made to that line", and that the City should let him know "if there is any 
information that you may need from me showing actual costs of installation ofthat line". Beclcstead 
submitted no costs or damages to the City for its consideration. The City denied his request to meet 
and discuss reimbursement by letter to him from Clyde G. Nelson dated November 16,2004 (713 
and Ex. F, G, Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen, R. Vol. 1, p. 176, 187, 188-1 89). 
11. There were no further requests or demands for reimbursement made to the City by 
Beckstead until the City received a letter dated April 11, 2006 from Beckstead's counsel Steven 
Fuller some 17- 18 months later. The letter replied to Mr. Nelson's letter to Beckstead of November 
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16,2004. Mr. Fuller requested that the City reconsider its position and meet with Beclcstead and Mr. 
Fuller to discuss reimbursement. As was conspicuously absent from Beckstead's letter of October 
22,2004, Mr. Fuller made no claim for damages or costs incurred by Beckstead that the City might 
owe him. The City rejected the request by letter from Mr. Nelson to Mr. Fuller dated May 24,2006. 
(714,15, and Ex. H, Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen, R. Vol. 1, pp. 176,190; Ex. C to Second Amended 
Complaint, R. Val. 2, pp. 71-74) 
12. On July 3 1,2006, approximately 20 months afler the City Itad rejected Beckstead's 
request for a conference with the City to discuss reimbursement, and approximately 32 months after 
construction was completed by Beclcstead, Beckstead filed aNotice of Claim with the City, and for 
the first time set forth, and made the City aware of, the construction costs and damages he allegedly 
suffered and claimed. The damages alleged were $10,603.60. Later, pursuant to a Second Amended 
Complaint filed by Beckstead on or about May 2,2007, Beckstead alleged that his damages were 
$13,153.64 in that he had made a mistake in computing the amount of construction costs. (716 and 
Ex. I to Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen, R. Val. 1, p. 176; Second Amended Complaint, R. Val. 1, pp. 
58-76). 
13. Not until July 3 1,2006, when the Notice of Claim was filed by Mr. Fuller with the 
City, was the City made aware of the alleged construction costs incurred by Mr. Beckstead and the 
amount of his alleged damages. Although Beckstead knew of his costs and damages when he 
completed construction, and at the latest, in November, 2003, he did not advise the City of this 
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amount until July 3 1,2006, when he filed his Notice of Tort Claim. (72, 3, 4, Third Affidavit of 
Darrel Wilburn, R. Vol. 2, pp. 269(a) - 269(b); 75, Affidavit of Clyde G. Nelson, R. Vol. 2, pp. 207- 
208; 74,5,6, Second Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen, R. Vol. 2, pp. 268-269). 
14. Never, during the platting of the subdivision, construction thereof or thereafter, 
did Beckstead discuss reimbursement with the City Clerk, City Engineer, or City Council. Prior to 
October 22,2004, Beckstead did not mention reimbursement to the City. No competitive bids for 
construction had been obtained. No money had been paid by Beckstead to the City. No verification 
of costs was made. No engineering drawings showing benefitted intervening properties had been 
prepared and no agreement had been entered into with Beckstead to define the commencement date 
of the agreement, the terms of the agreement, the properties benefitted and the amount which would 
be due from each intervening property owner or the amount to be collected by the City. (79, Affidavit 
of Jerry C. Larsen, R. Vol.1, p. 175; 712, Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn, R. Vol. 2, p. 202) 
15. The district court issued its Memorandum Decision in favor of the City denying 
Beckstead's claims, and the City avoided all liability in the case. (Memorandum Decision, R. Vol. 
2, pp. 274-280.) Judgment was entered in favor ofthe City on August 16,2007. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 281- 
282) 
16. Tlie City requested an award of attorney fees in its Answer (R. Vol. 1, pp. 8 1-87) and 
Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees (R. Vol. 2, pp. 283-299) pursua~ll to $3  12-1 17, 12-120, and 12- 
121, LC., and Rules 54 and 68, I.R.C.P. The City timely filed its Motion accompanied by an 
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Affidavit of counsel and Verified Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees. As part of the 
Affidavit, proof was submitted that the City had offered to settle for the sum of $4,000.00 by written 
letter dated February 13, 2007. (R. Vol. 2, pp 287-288), and an Offer of Judgment dated February 
16, 2007, for the sum of $5,000.00. (R. Vol. 2, pp 285-292). These offers were rejected by 
Beckstead. 
Following hearing on the motion, the court entered its Memorandum Decision on attorney 
fees and an Amended Judgment on October 30,2007, finding that the City was the prevailing party, 
awarding it costs on appeal, but denying the City's request for attorney fees. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 327- 
335). The City filed its Notice of Cross Appeal on November 2,2007, alleging that the district court 
had erred in denying the City attorney fees in this action. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 336-338) 
I. BECKSTEAD FAILED TO INVOKE 
ORDINANCE NO. 16.28.030B 
Beckstead makes the argument that the City failed to conlply with the terms of its ordinance 
in refusing to reimburse Becltstead for the waterline construction. Beckstead chooses to ignore the 
fact that he failed to take the initial steps rcquired by the ordinance to subject to the City to the 
reimbursement process. 
The ordinance was codified in the Preston Municipal Code under Section 16.28.030B which 
reads as follows: 
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Whenever any intervening property ("off-site") is benefitted by the installation of any 
of the required facilities, the subdivider may pay the costs of such facilities to the 
city, such costs to be determined by competitive bids solicited by the city, together 
with verified engineering costs required therefore. The City shall thereafter enter a 
deferred credit in its books and records and shall charge the benefitted intervening 
property owners the fee rates for sewer and water connections in effect at the time 
such connections are made. Such fees shall then be returned to the subdivider to 
reimburse the costs of the installation of the facilities; such agreement for 
reimbursement shall extend for a maximum period of five years from initial date of 
agreement after which time no further reimbursement shall be made to the 
subdivider. The city may also elect to reimburse the subdivider for such "off-site" 
facilities in full or in part after the subdivider has furnished the City with acceptable 
evidence that a11 agreed number of housing units are occupied. No interest shall 
accrue or become payable on such reimbursement. Engineering drawings showing 
benefitted property shall be prepared by the city engineer and copies forwarded to the 
sewer, water and streets departments of the City. 
Thus, the ordinance talces effect, if and when, the subdivider (Beckstead) pays the costs of the 
improvements to the City based upon competitive bids and verified engineering costs. Only then 
does the City have the duty to enter a deferred credit in its boolts and charge the benefitted 
intervening property owners fees for connections necessary to reimburse the subdivider. The fees 
are those collected as a result of an agreement for reimbursement between the City and the 
subdivider and are to be collected over a maximum period of five years from the initial date ofthe 
agreement. Once the five years has expired, the City has no duty to pay the subdivider from fees 
collected although the subdivider may not have been fully reimbursed. 
Beckstead argues that the use of the word "may" in the ordinance places no duty on a 
subdivider to activate the ordinance. Becltstead argues that the use of the word "may" malces it a 
Respondent / Cvoss-Appellant Brief - Page 9 
"permissive or noiunandatory" duty upon the subdivider. Beckstead further argues that the City 
should have required competitive bids and verified engineering costs regardless of the fact that 
Beckstead failed to notify the City that he wished to be reimbursed under the ordinance and instead 
constructed the line on ltis own. 
Beckstead cites the case of R$e v. Long 127 Idaho 841, 848; 908 P.2d 143, 150 (1995) for 
the definition of the word "may". (Appellants' Brief, p. 15) There the court stated in defining "may" 
that the word expressed "the right to exercise discretion". 
The district court ruled that Beckstead failed to invoke the ordinance thereby waiving any 
right to reimbursement. The district court stated: 
" The ordinance gives a subdivider the right to reimbursement for the expenses they 
incur for benefitting offsite properties. There is a process by which the subdivider 
acquires this right. First, the subdivider may pay the City the costs for installation of 
any required facilities. Second, the cost paid to the City is to be determined by 
competitive bids solicited by the City along with engineering costs. Third, the costs 
are verified. Lastly, the ordinance also requires an agreement between the City and 
the Developer". (Memorandum Decision, R. Vol. 2, p. 276.) 
The court also stated: 
"......the options are either to pay the costs and invoke the ordinance, or not to pay the 
costs and forego the reimbursement provided under the ordinance. Becltstead opted 
to do the work himself and thus the City was never put on notice as to their 
ordinance because they created it. Nevertheless, the City has a right to know option 
of soliciting competitive bids. The City undoubtedly knew of when a person is 
invoking the ordinance. By opting not to pay the City the costs and do the work 
himself, Mr. Beckstead failed to initiate tlte ordinance and thereby put the City on 
notice. (Memorandum Decision, R. Vol. 2, pp.276-277) 
The court went on to say: 
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"The second step of the ordinance provides a method by which the costs are to be 
determined. There is no evidence that Mr. Beckstead ever formed an agreement with 
the City prior, or during this project, by which the City could determine the cost of 
the project. According to Affidavit in Support of Plaintiffs Motion fov Summary 
Judgment Beckstead indicates that he was aware of the ordinance prior to the 
developmellt of Creamery I-Iollow Subdivision. Mr. Beckstead knew of the 
ordinance and could have opted to pay the costs and bid on the project himself. The 
ordinance is designed to benefit those who pay for the costs which are solicited by 
the City. There is no evidence that the City ever had the opportunity to solicit 
coinpetitive bids because Mr. Beckstead did not follow the procedure of the 
ordinance. He cannot claim reimbursement expost facto." (Memorandum Decision, 
R. Val. 2, p. 277) 
The ruling by the district court. is correct. The term "may" used in the ordinance allows the 
subdivider discretion to invoke the ordinance and pay the costs to the City. However, before the City 
is mandated to call for competitive bids and to verify costs, the subdivider must exercise that 
discretion and invoke the ordinance. If the subdivider fails to do so, the City cannot insure that the 
lowest cost of installation is obtained through competitive bids which directly affects the fees 
subsequently charged by the City and paid by the intervening connectors. The City is not able to 
enter a deferred credit in its books on behalf of the subdivider, establish prorata shares for the 
intervening property owners, determine which properties are benefitted by the installation, or what 
fees to charge. The ordinance requires that the city engineer prepare drawings "showing benefitted 
property". Without the subdivider exercising his discretion and invoking the ordinance prior to 
construction, none of the duties imposed upon the City are activated. 
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The process is simple: 
1. The subdivider notifies the City that he wishes to invoke the ordinance. 
2. The City calls for bids. 
3. Upon receipt of bids, the lowest bid is established, and the engineer verifies the 
costs. 
4. The subdivider pays the bid price to the City. 
5. The engineer determines which intervening properties will be benefitted and 
the prorata share of the cost of each intervening property. 
6. An agreement is prepared establishing the terms of the agreement, its starting 
and ending date, identifying the intervening properties, the amount to be 
reimbursed to the subdivider, the prorata share that each intervening property 
owner will pay if connected, and the fees that will be assessed by the City to each 
intervening property owner necessary to reimburse the subdivider. 
7. The bid is awarded and construction is completed . 
8. The City enters the deferred credit into its boolcs on behalf of the subdivider 
and imposes additional connection fees on intervening property owners if and 
when connected, in addition to the normal fees imposed by the City for it 
connecting users to its water main. 
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By Becltstead failing to involte the ordinance, and instead constructing the line on his own, 
none of the required elements of the ordinance could be initiated. Beckstead did not notify the City 
that he wanted reimbursement. Instead, he constructed the line in October 2003, and waited until 
October 22, 2004, to send a letter to the City requesting to meet with the City to discuss 
reimbursement. The City denied that request for reimbursement by letter of the city attorney of 
November 16,2004. At the time of Beckstead's reauest, the City had already collected all fees for 
all intervening connections made to the line. which fees merely reimbursed the City for its costs in 
making the connections. As Beckstead failed to invoke the ordinance, no additional fees with which 
to reimburse Beclcstead had been collected. No other connections have been made to the waterline. 
11. THE CITY HAS NOT BEEN UNJUSTLY ENRICHED 
Beckstead argues that the retention of the fees paid by intervening property owners would 
be a windfall to the City and result in unjust enrichment of the City. Nothing could be further from 
the truth. Prior to construction of Beckstead's subdivision, all intervening properties which 
eventually connected to the line were served by a four inch line. When Beckstead applied for a 
subdivision of twenty-two lots, the Franklin County Fire District, not the City, ruled that a six inch 
connection to an existing four inch line would not provide adequate fire flow for his subdivision. 
The District would not approve a six inch connection to the four inch line. Without replacing the 
four inch line with a six inch line, Beckstead's subdivision could not he approved. He chose to 
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replace the four inch line in order to obtain adequate fire flow for his subdivision. (72-5, Second 
Affidavit of Darrell Wilbum, R. Vol. 2, pp. 233-234) This resulted in 700 feet of additional pipe 
being installed by Beckstead as he selected a route which was more convenient for him. The six inch 
line was not needed by the City as it already had a four inch line serving adjoining properties. It was 
necessary for Beckstead because he could not obtain the necessary fire flowpermit from the Franklin 
County Fire District without constructing that line. Without the fire flow, he could not obtain 
approval from the Fire District. Thus, no subdivision would be constructed. The line benefitted 
Beckstead only. 
The City charges $2,500.00 for each water connection made to the water main to reimburse 
the City for its costs in making the connection. The costs for a connection in 2004 were $2,618.07. 
The present cost for connecting is $3,349.00. (79, Affidavit of Darrell Wilburn, R. Vol. 2, p. 202). 
There have been five connections made to the waterline constructed by Beckstead. The fees 
of $2,500.00 per comlection for all five connections were paid prior to Becltstead's letter of October 
22,2004. Four of the five connections were made prior to his letter and the last one within a month 
thereafter. No other connections have been made. (710,11,12, Affidavit of Jerry C. Larsen, R. Vol. 
1, pp. 175-176). The fees collected were ones which only partially reimbursed the City for & costs. 
Because Beclcstead failed to notify the City before fees were paid and connections made, the City 
collected only what was owing it for its costs. It received no monies in excess of its costs, thus no 
windfall. The replacement of the four inch line did not benefit the City and was required by the 
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Franklin County Fire District, not the City. The water line has only benefitted Beckstead enabling 
him to construct his subdivision. The City had a four inch line which would have served the 
intervening property owners. 
Beckstead seeks recovery of the entire cost of his construction from the City for the fees 
collected by the City for five intervening connections. The total collected by the City was 
$12,500.00. If this were permitted, five connections would nearly reimburse Beckstead for all his 
costs, although lie greatly benefitted fromconstructionof this line. Yet, Beckstead chooses to ignore 
the benefit he obtained for his Subdivision and the twenty-two lots which were connected to the line. 
Without the benefit of an agreement between the parties designating the benefitted properties, the 
prorata share required of each, the amount of additional fees to be charged by the City, and the 
amount to be paid by each connector, a windfall results. However, it is a windfall to Beckstead 
resulting in his unjust enrichment. 
Furthermore, Beclcstead failed to file a notice of claim with the City claiming unjust 
enrichment. It is essential that Becltstead have made a claim for unjust enrichment prior to filing 
suit, if he wished to recover for the same. 
In Magnuson Properties v. Coeur D'Alene, 138 Idaho 166, 59 P.3d 971(2002) Magnuson 
argued that the Tort Claims Act (Ch.9, Title 6 )  notice requirement did not apply to its equitable 
claims. The court refused to consider that contention as it had been raised for the first time on 
appeal. Nevertheless, tlie court stated as follows: 
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Even if Magnuson had properly raised the issue, this Court has construed I.C. 
550-219 to require a claimant to file notice of all claims for damages against 
a government entity, tort or otherwise, as directed by the ICA. (138 Idaho at 
170, citing Seizer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 572,798 P.2d 27 (1990) 
Beckstead failed to claim unjust enrichment by his letter of October 22,2004 or his Notice 
of Claim of July 3 1, 2006. Thus, his claim of unjust enrichment should be denied. 
111. BECKSTEAD FAILED TO TIMELY 
FILE A NOTICE OF CLAIM 
Beckstead failed to file notice of claim with the City pursuant to statute, and his claim 
against the City is barred. 
550-219, I.C. states: 
50-219. DAMAGE CLAIMS. All claims for damages against a city 
must be filed as prescribed by Chapter 9, Title 6, Idaho Code. 
The definition of a "claim" is set forth in $6-902(7): 
"Claim" means any wriflen demand to recover money damages from 
a governmental entity or its employee which any person is legally 
entitled to recover under this act as compensation for the negligent or 
otherwise wrongful act or olnission of a governmental entity or its 
employee when acting within the course or scope of his employment. 
The time for filing a claim with a governmental entity is set forth in 56-906, I.C. 
6-906. FILING CLAIMS AGAINST POLITICAL SUBDIVISION 
OR EMPLOYEE --TIME. All claims against a political subdivision 
[subdivision] arising under the provisions of this act and all claims 
against an employee of a political subdivision for any act or omission 
of the employee within the course or scope of his employment shall 
be presented to and filed with the clerk or secretary of the political 
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subdivision within one hundred eighty (180) days ikom the date the 
claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is 
later. 
The requirements for the content of a claim are prescribed in 56-907, LC. which reads in part 
as follows: 
6-907. CONTENTS OF CLAIMS -- FILING BY AGENT OR 
ATTORNEY -- EFFECT OF INACCURACIES. All claims presented 
to and filed with a governmental entity shall accurately describe the 
conduct and circumstances which brought about the injury or damage, 
describe the injury or damage, state the time and place the injury or 
damage occurred, state the names of all persons involved, if known, 
and shall contain the amount of damages claimed, together with a 
statement of the actual residence of the claimant at the time of 
presenting and filing the claim and for a period of six (6) months 
immediately prior to the time the claim arose. 
Beckstead completed construction in October, 2003. At that time he lcnew his construction 
costs. (75 and Ex. C1-C3, Affidavit of Clyde G. Nelson, R. Vol. 2, p. 208; 73, Third Affidavit of 
Beckstead, R. Vol. 2, p. 271). 
The district court ruled that Beckstead was fully aware of his costs at the time of completion 
of construction but had failed to timely submit a notice of claim within 180 days thereafter. The 
district court opined that the October 22,2004, letter from Beckstead "may suffice as a claim" but 
ruled that if that were the case, Beckstead had not filed the same within 180 days after completion 
of construction when he was aware of the costs. The district court found: 
"Beckstead knew the costs of the project on November 12,2003, as 
evidenced by Beckstead's Third Affidavit in Response to 
Defindent'sReply to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment 73 
where Becltstead states, "Defendant had knowledge at the time the 
pipeline was installed of the costs incurred by myself in purchasing 
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the pipe for the project." This necessitates Beckstead's knowledge of 
the costs as well. If the City is expected to be able to discern the costs 
of the project from this Mr. Beckstead should be held to at least that 
same standard. The attached invoice for the pipe cost is signed by the 
City Engineer on November 12, 2003, after the labor had been 
performed. Beckstead failed to make his claim at the same time he 
submitted the invoice despite having knowledge of the cost and the 
project being finished. Mr. Beckstead did not meet the 180 day 
deadline because the letter was not sent until October 22, 2004, 
almost a year later. The attachment is Beckstead's ThivdAfJidavit in 
Response to Defendant's Reply to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment dated November 12, 2003, marked the beginning of the 
tolling because Beckstead was fully apprised at that time of the injury 
and damages as well as the government's role. Doe v. Durtschi, 110 
Idaho 466 (1986). Plaintiffs claim is barred under I.C. 56-906 and 
the 180 day time limit for claims against Municipalities." 
(Memorandum Decision, R. Vol. 2, pp. 278-279) 
The district court's ruling in that Beckstead had not timely filed a notice of claim is correct. 
The court in Farber v. State, 102 Idaho 398,630 P.2d 685 (1981) and again in C&G, Inc. v. 
Canyon Highway District No. 4,139 Idaho 140,75 P.3d 194 (2003) found that the date aconstruction 
project is completed triggers the notice requirement of 56-906 LC. As Beclcstead completed his 
construction of the 800 East waterline in October, 2003, and was aware of the costs, he was required 
to file a Notice of Claim no later than May, 2004. 
Beckstead purchased and installed 1,240 feet of waterline, and the 460 feet of line provided 
by the City for a total of 1,700 feet. He received billings at the time of installation from his 
contractor and material providers. Copies of invoices from Irrigation Aid Co. and WR White Supply 
for pipe totaling 1,240 feet, and an invoice from Gary's Backhoe Service for excavation work were 
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received by Becltstead on or about the time that he completed the construction project. The City was 
first made aware of these costs in Beckstead's Response to Discovery of 2007. (15 and Ex. C to 
Affidavit of Clyde Nelson, R. Vol. 2, pp. 208,213-215) Beckstead was aware of the costs of his 
improvements and labor when he completed his construction in October, 2003. His cause of action, 
if any, arose at that time. As he was aware of the amount he alleges should have been reimbursed 
to him from future connections to the line at that time, he was required to male a claim against the 
City. The court stated in Mitchell v. Bingkam Memorial Hospital, 130 Idaho 420,423,942 P.2d 544 
"This Court has held that "@]nowledge of facts which would put a reasonably 
prudent person on inquiry is the equivalent to knowledge of the wrongful act and will 
start the running of the [I80 days]." McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 
722,747 P.2d 741, 744 (1987). The Court has further held that the statutory period 
begins to run from the occurrence of the wrongful act even if the full extent of 
damages is not known at that time. Id See also Ralphs v. City of Spirit Lake, 98 
Idaho 225,227,560 P.2d 1315, 1317 (1977). In a recent case, the Court of Appeals 
clarified the amount of knowledge required to begin the notice period: "The statute 
does not begin running when a person f~illy understands the mechanism of the inji~ry 
and the government's role, but rather when he or she is aware of such facts that would 
cause a reasonably prudent person to inquire further into the circumstances 
surrounding the incident." Mallory v. City ofMontpelier, 126 Idaho 446,448, 885 
P.2d 1162,1164 (Ct.App. 1994). The claimant in Mallory had argued that the notice 
period should not start running until she knew the exact cause of her injury. The 
Court of Appeals held that "such an interpretation would allow a party to delay 
completion of an investigation for inonths or even years before submitting a notice 
under the [ITCAJ." 126 Idaho at 449, 885 P.2d at 1165. 
Nevertheless, Beckstead presented no claim prepared in accordance with $6-907 until July 
3 1,2006, nearly 32 months later. If the letter of October 22,2204, constituted a claim, neither claim 
was filed within the 180 day period required in 56-906, I.C. 
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There have been only five connections to the waterline by intervening third parties since 
Beckstead constructed the waterline. Four of these connections were made on October 12,2004 and 
one onNovember 16,2004. No connection has been made since that time. Beclcstead was aware of 
these connections as evidenced by his letter of October 22, 2004 to the City wherein he refers to 
"several water connections" having been made for which he sought his meeting to discuss 
reimbursement. His request was denied by the City on November 16, 2004 by letter of Clyde 
Nelson, City Attorney. If the date of completion of the project was not the date the "claim arose or 
reasonably should have been discovered" and the City's response of November 16,2004 is deemed 
to be the "wrongful act" complained of, the Notice of Claim presented by Beckstead's counsel was 
not filed with the City for. twenty-two months. In either scenario, Beckstead has not met the 
requirements of 56-906 requiring him to file a Notice of Claim with the City within 180 days after 
the claim arose or should have been discovered. At the very least, Beckstead was aware on 
November 16,2004, that his request for reimbursement was denied. Beckstead's Complaint is for 
payment of those kinds by the City to Beckstead. Thus, Beckstead was required to file a Notice of 
Claim, if not within 180 days after October, 2003, then at the very least within 180 days after 
November 16,2004. 
In Magnuson Properties v. Coeur D'Alene, supra, the Court addressed a situation similar to, 
if not exactly on point, to the question presented in this case. Magnuson was the owner of 
undeveloped property it wished to develop. As part of the approval of the subdivision on this 
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property, the city required Magnuson to extend a sewer tine from its property to an adjoining parcel 
owned by a third party. Magnuson objected because of the increased cost to it. Magnuson stated 
that a city engineer had advised its representatives that the city would reimburse Magnuson for the 
additional cost to Magnuson as a result of the extension of the sewer line. Magnuson stated that it 
relied upon this representation to extend the line. On May 10, 1996, at Magnuson's direction, the 
general contractor submitted a statement of reimbursable costs to the city. The contractor itemized 
the extracosts attributable to the extensionof $30,802.00, and demanded the city pay Magnuson that 
amount. The city responded to this request on August 13, 1996, denying the existence of any 
agreement between the city and Magnuson and denying the demand for reimbursement. The city 
acknowledged its policy of requiring property owners to extend sewer lines to the farthest boundary 
of the property when installing a sewer line. I-Iowever, the city's policy was to only reimburse 
property owners for costs associated with enlarging the size of sewer pipe and deeper excavation. 
Magnusou made repeated attempts to discuss the request for reimbursement with the city. The city 
met With Magnuson on November 7, 1996 and reiterated its denial of Magnuson's claim for 
reimbursement. Magnuson paid his contractor the sum requested to be reimbursed on November 
11,1996, and filed a Notice of Claim against the city on February 18,1997. Magnuson filed suit on 
October 16, 1998. The city filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that Magnuson's 
claim was barred by $50-219 and $6-906, Idaho Code, and the district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the city. This decision was appealed, and the Supreme Court upheld the 
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decision of the district court. The Court held: 
A. The Time For Filing Notice Of A Claim Under I.C. 5s 50-219 And 6- 
906 Began To Run When Magnuson Received The City's August 13, 
1996 Letter Of Denial. 
I.C. $8 50-219 (2000) requires filing any claim for damages against a 
govermnent entity as required by the ITCA. IDAHO CODE $ 5  6-901 (2000). 
A claimant has one hundred eighty (180) days from the day they knew, or 
should have known, of the claim to provide notice of the claim to the 
government entity. IDAHO CODE §§ 6-906 (2000). This notice requirement 
applies equally to tort claims and claims for breach of contract. Enterprise, 
Inc. v. Nampa City, 96 Idaho 734, 737-38, 536 P.2d 729, 732-33 (1975); 
IDAHO CODE 8850-219 and 6-906 (2002). 
The 180-day notice period begins to run at the occurrence of a wrongful act, 
even if the extent of damages is not known or is unpredictable at the time. 
Ralphsv. CityofSpiritLake, 98 Idaho 225,227,560P.2d 1315,1317 (1977). 
"Knowledge of facts which would put a reasonably prudent person on 
inquiry," triggers the 180-day period. McQuillen v. City ofAmmon, 1 13 Idaho 
719,722,747 P.2d 741,744 (1987). Compliance with the notice requirement 
is a "mandatory condition precedent to bringing suit [against a city], the 
failure of which is fatal to a claim, no matter how legitimate." Id. A claimant 
is not required to know all the facts and details of a claim because such a 
prerequisite would allow aclaimant to delay completion of their investigation 
before triggering the notice requirement. Mitchell v. Bingham Memorial 
IJbsp.,l30 Idaho 420,423,942 P.2d 544,547 (1997). 
The record reflects that, at the very latest, Magnuson had knowledge of the 
City's August 13, 1996 letter on August 15, 1996, which places Magnuson's 
February 18,1997 notice beyond the 180-day period. The City's letter denies 
the existence of any agreement between the City and Magnuson and rejects 
Magnuson's request for reimbursement. As of August 15,1996, areasonable 
and prudent person would have knowledge of facts of a wro~~gful act, i.e., the 
City's denial of andlor breach of the alleged contract. Therefore, the 180-day 
notice period begail on August 15, 1996, and Magnuson failed to provide 
timely notice of its claim. 138 Idaho 169-1 70 
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Beckstead submitted a letter on October 22,2004 requesting to meet with the City to discuss 
reimbursement. The City denied that request and any reimbursement by its response of November 
16,2004. Pursuant to the Magnuson case, the time period for filing Beckstead's claim colnmenced 
on November 16,2004, and expired on May 16,2005. Beckstead did not file a notice of ciaim until 
July 3 1,2006. The notice of claim was filed more than 180 days after the City's denial of meeting 
and reimbursement. Consequently, Beckstead failed to provide timely notice of his claim, and 
cannot seelc recovery against the City. 
IV. THE LETTER OF OCTOBER 22, 2004, DOES NOT 
CONSTITUTE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 56-907, 
IDAHO CODE 
86-907, LC, prescribes the required contents of a claim. These include an accurate 
description of the circumstances causing the damages, a description of those damages, the time and 
place they occurred, the persons involved, and the amount of damages claimed. Defendant attempts 
to assert that his letter of October 22,2004, constituted sufficient notice of claim under the statute. 
The inadequacy of this letter to constitute a statutory claim is evident from its contents. The letter 
makes no demand to recover money damages from the City as required by $6-902(7), I.C., but 
merely requests a meeting to discuss reimbursement; it fails to designate the materials provided or 
labor performed which would give rise to the claim; it does not describe the circumstances giving 
rise to the claim; it fails to set forth the parties connecting to the line from whom Beckstead asserts 
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the City should have obtained fees for reimbursement to him where the comlections had been made; 
and more importantly, it fails to state an amount of damages. This letter request was denied by the 
City pursuant to letter from its attorney dated November 16, 2004. Beckstead appears to have 
accepted this denial by the City waiting until April 11,2006, to send a letter to the City through his 
attorney renewing his request for a meeting with the City to discuss reimbursement. The amount of 
damages allegedly suffered by Beckstead, was not raised by his letter of October 22,2004, nor was 
it raised in his April 11, 2006 letter. It was not until July 31, 2006, that Beckstead filed a claim 
setting forth the elements required in $6-907,1.C. and the amount of damages claimed. Obviously, 
counsel for Beckstead recognized the inadequacy of Beckstead's letter of October 22, 2004, by 
renewing his request to meet with the City in April, and subsequently filing a Notice of Claim in July 
which did meet the criteria of $6-907, I.C. 
The Court has addressed the requirements for a proper claim and the inadequate provisions 
of certain claims which render a claiin invalid. In Foster v. Kootenai Medical Center, 143 Idaho 
425, 146 P.3d 691 (Ct. App. 2006) Plaintiff's attorney submitted a letter to the Idaho State Board of 
Medicine (ISBM) of medical malpractice against a doctor performing an operation at the county 
medical center. The hospital received that correspondence from ISBM. The district court found that 
the Plaintiff had never filed a formal notice of tort claim with the county, and that even assuming that 
the letter did constitute notice, the fact that it omitted a statement of damages rendered it inadequate 
under $6-907, LC. The Court found that no claim had been submitted to the hospital pursuant to $6- 
906 I.C. 
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In BHA Investments, Inc. v. City ofBoise, 141 Idaho 168, 108 P.3d 315(2004) Bravo 
submitted a claim to the city setting forth the amount of damages but failing to mention another party 
"Splitting Kings". The Court ruled that this notice of claim was untimely. Bravo and Splitting Kings 
then elected to rely upon a notice of claim filed by BHA. Ilowever that claim failed to mention the 
names of Bravo and Splitting Kings. The Court ruled that because the notice of claim filed by BHA 
did not include the names and addresses of either Bravo or Splitting Kings, it was not sufficient 
under $6-907, LC. and said claims were barred under state law. 
In Mitchell v. Bingharn Memorial Hospital, 130 Idaho 420,942 P.2d 544(1997), the Plaintiff 
was overdosed by the hospital. This resulted in injury to her. Plaintiffs attorney spoke with the 
hospital administrator about the Plaintiffs claim prior to the expiration of the 180 day notice period 
required under $6-906, LC. He also submitted copies of documents to the hospital that identified 
the Plaintiffs, the hospitalization and chaxges at issue, and their damages as known at that time. 
However, due to negotiations between the hospital and Plaintiffs attorney, the Plaintiff failed to file 
anotice of claim pursuant to $6-906, LC. within 180 days. The Plaintiff attempted to assert that his 
two phone conversations with the hospital and his submission of documentation to the hospital 
constituted a valid claim under 56-907 LC. The court ruled oral communications made 
by the Plaintiff, or her attorney, did not constitute the filing of a claim as it is required by $6-902(7), 
I.C. and 56-907, I.C. The Court stated that the conversations and the submission of the 
documentation did not preclude the requirement for a Plaintiff to file a formal claim with a 
governmental entity. 
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The Court has also stated in McQuillen v. City ofAmmon, 113 Idaho 719, 722, 747 P.2d 
741(1987) that actual knowledge or notice given to a govermnental entity does not excuse a Plaintiff 
from filing a formal written claim. There the Court stated: 
Further, in actions against governmental entities, plaintifk are not exempt 
from the notice of claim requirements because of substantial actual notice 
having been given. Independent School Dist. of Boise City v. Callister, 97 
Idaho 59, 539 P.2d 987 (1975), disapproved on other grounds, Larson v. 
Emmett Joint School Dist. No. 221,99 Idaho 120, 577 P.2d 1168 (1978). 
Calkins v. Fruitland, 97 Idaho 263,543 P.2d 166 (1975). See also Newlan v. 
State, supra. 
In Thompson v. City of Idaho Falls, 126 Idaho 587,887 P.2d 1094 (Ct. App. 1994), a city 
employee was discharged from employment. She filed a Notice of Tort Claim with the city against 
another employee of the city for interference with contract. The court ruled she had not described 
the conduct and circumstances which brought about the alleged injury or complied with the other 
specifications of 36-907, I.C. regarding that claim. Tl~erefore, the Court found that the Notice of 
Claim was insufficient under 56-907, I.C. 
In Wichtrom v. North Idaho College, 11 1 Idaho 450, 725 P.2d 155 (1986) the Plaintiffs 
attended a course at the college and successfully completed the same. They sued the college for 
damages upon discovery that they were not qualified as entry level journeymen after successful 
completion of the course, contrary to a statement made in a school bulletin. Prior to suing the 
college, the Plaintiffs' attorney sent a letter to the college detailing the Plaintiffs' dissatisfaction with 
the course and their intent to take legal action if the college did not compensate them for sacrifices 
made in attending the course for 1 1 months. The letter failed to state Plaintiffs' names and addresses, 
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the amount of any damages they had incurred, and the nature of any injuries suffered. The trial court 
held that the Idaho Tort Claims Act applied, and the Plaintiff had not complied with the provisions 
of I.C. 56-907. It granted Summary Judgment on behalf of the college. The Plaintiffs appealed. The 
Court, after quoting 56-907, LC., held in favor of the college stating: 
The demand letter of August 2 I ,  1984 failed to serve as notice of a 
claim pursuant to the I.T.C.A., since it failed to state the names and 
addresses of the claimants, the amounts of claimed damages and the 
nature of the injury claimed. The claim is, therefore, barred. I.C. 
$6-907; (1 11 Idaho 452) 
Becltstead attempts to distinguish Magnuson from this case stating that he has treated the 
letter of October 22,2004, as a notice of claim from its inception. If that were the case, why the 
subsequent letter of April 11,2006 from Beckstead's counsel requesting the meeting, and why the 
necessity to file aNotice of Claim on July 31,2006? Beckstead's counsel realized that the initial 
letter of October 22,2004 was inadequate and did not constitute a claim. 
Beckstead quotes Justices Eisman and Waiters in their special concurring opinion in 
Magnuson stating that the letter of May 10, 1996, constituted a claim and after the city's denial in 
that case, Magnuson would have been allowed to file suit. That was not the opinion of the Court. 
The opinion of the court was that the letter of May 10, 1996, may have "arguably" constituted a 
notice of claim under the ITCA. As that issue had not been raised, it was not considered by the 
court. 
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We do not know the contents of the Magnuson letter of May 10, 1996, what criteria of $6- 
907, I. C. it may have set forth, and whether it met the requirements of a notice of claim. However, 
we do know that the letter in Magnuson specifically made a claim for damages in the form of a 
statement of reimbursable costs of $30,802.00 and demanded the citv pay Magnuson that amount. 
(Beckstead only advised the City that he would like to meet and discuss reimbursement). Thus, we 
know that a crucial element of a claim, the amount of damages, was set forth by Magnuson. 
Beckstead failed to allege damages or make demand for payment of a specific amount either in his 
letter of October 22,2004, or his counsel's letter of April 1 I ,  2006. 
Beckstead knew the amount of his damages by November, 2003. He had purchased the pipe, 
contracted for backhoe digging, and performed labor on the project himself. Thus, his costs were 
lmown to him. I-Ie knew that connections had been made in October, 2004. Yet, he failed to itemize 
his costs and make demand upon the City for a specific sum, failed to describe the injury or damage, 
and failed to set forth the time and date when his alleged claim arose. Beckstead's letter fails to meet 
the requirements of $6-907, I.C. and does not constitute a claim. 
V. THE CITY WAS MISLED TO ITS INJURY BY 
BECKSTEAD'S FAILURE TO INVOKE THE 
ORDINANCE OR TO TIMELY SUBMIT A CLAIM. 
The flaws in the letter of October 22, 2004, rendered that letter insufficient to constitute 
notice and the City was misled to its injury thereby. Cox v. City of Sandpoint, 140 Idaho 127, 90 
P.3d 352 (Ct. App. 2003). The City denied Beckstead's letter of October 22,2004, by its counsel's 
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letter of November 16, 2004. Beckstead took no further action until April, 2006. The letter of 
October 22,2004, was definitely inadequate under the terms of 96-907, Idaho Code. At the very 
least, it failed to contain any reference to the amount of damages claimed. At the time of submission 
of this letter, the City had received all fees from the five connections made to the line. Those fees 
were for the City's costs of connection. As Beckstead had failed to advise the City of his intent to 
attempt to invoke the ordinance, and his untimely submission of his letter, the City was precluded 
from collecting additional fees from intervening connections with which to reimburse Beckstead. 
The City cannot retroactively attempt to cure Beckstead's failure to invoke the ordinance, and any 
payment to Beckstead would be from funds derived from the City's collection of its own connection 
fees, not from fees generated by an ordinance of the City assessing additional fees for 
reimbursement, 
VI. THE CITY SHOULD BE AWARDED ITS 
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL 
PURSUANT TO @12-117,12-120,12-121, IDAHO 
CODE AND RULE 41, I.A.R. 
The City was the prevailing party in the district court action. The district court found for the 
City denying all of Beckstead's claims. Beckstead failed to take preliminary action in requesting the 
City to invoke the ordinance. Instead, he waited for nearly one year before asking to meet with the 
City to discuss reimbursement. He did not file a notice of claim for nearly three years. Iiis action 
in pursuing his claim is without reasonable basis in law or fact and is frivolous. Thus, the City should 
be awarded attorney fees and costs on appeal pursuant to $§12-1 17 and 12-121, Idaho Code. As the 
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City is the prevailing party, and the action was one for less than $25,000.00, the City should recover 
its costs and attorney fees pursuant to $12-120(1), Idaho Code. Attorney fees are also requested 
pursuant to Rule 41, I.A.R. 
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CROSS APPEAL 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING AN AWARD TO 
THE CITY OF ITS ATTORNEY FEES 
The district court erred in denying the City's request for attorney fees. The court ruled that 
the City was the prevailing party (Memorandum Decision, R. Vol. 2, p 328), awarded costs, but 
found that the City was not entitled to attorney fees under $ 5  12-1 17 and 12-121, Idaho Code or Rule 
68 I.R.C.P. The court held that it could not find that Beckstead acted without a reasonable basis in 
fact or law under $12-117(2)(R., Vol. 2, pp 329-330) and that Beckstead's action could not be 
deemed to have been pursued frivolously as required under 5 12-121, Idaho Code and Rule 54(c)(l) 
I.R.C.P. (R., Vol. 2, pp 330-331). The court ruled the same as to the Rule 68 request for attorney 
fees stating that it could not find that Beckstead had frivolously pursued his claim. The district court 
failed to address the Citv's claim for attorney fees pursuant to 612-120. LC. 
The City is the prevailing party. The district court found for the City against Beckstead 
denying all of Beckstead's claims. The City escaped all liability in this case. The court ruled in its 
Memorandum Decision on attorney fees that the City was the prevailing party. This Court found in 
Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc,. 141 Idaho 716,719, 1 17 P.3d 130 
(2005) that the district court had erred in failing to find that Nord was a prevaling party. It held: 
"Viewing its success from an overall standpoint, Nord Excavating 
was a prevailing party. In ruling it was not, the district court focused 
too much attention on the Company's less than tremendous success 
on its counterclaim and seemingly ignored the hct  that the Company 
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avoided all liability as a defendant. The district court improperly 
undervalued the Company's successful defense. Avoiding liability is 
a significant benefit to a defendant. In baseball, it is said that a walk 
is as good as a hit. The latter, of course, is more exciting. In litigation, 
avoiding liability is as good for a defendant as winning a money 
judgment is for a plaintiff. The point is, while a plaintiff with a large 
money judgment may be more exalted than a defendant who simply 
walks out of court no worse for the wear, courts must not ignore the 
value of a successful defense. In this case, logic suggests that a 
verdict in Nord Excavating's favor and a victory on its counterclaim 
(albeit, a relatively small one), by definition, makes it a prevailing 
party". 
The Court in Eighteen Mile remanded the case to the district court directing it to award 
attorney fees to Nord pursuant to 5 12-120, LC. 
A district court's determination whether a party is a prevailing party will not be disturbed on 
appeal absent an abuse of discretion. Mihalka v. Shepherd, 2008 Opinion No. 45, (March 28,2008) 
The City is entitled to its attorney fees pursuant to 5 12-120(1). That section reads in part 
as follows: 
(1) Except as provided in subsectiolls (3) and (4) of this section, in 
any action where the amount pleaded is Twenty-five Thousand 
dollars ($25,000) or less, there shall be taxed and allowed to the 
prevailing party, as part of the costs of the action, a reasonable 
amount to be fixed by the court as attorney's fees. 
Beckstead's Second Amended Complaint sought to recover the sum of $1 3,153.64 (R., Vol. 
1, p 65). The amount sought by Beckstead was less than $25,000.00. The award of attorney fees 
to the prevailing party is mandatory pursuant to said section and is not subject to the standard of 
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acting "without areasonable basis in fact or law" as required by $12-1 17, I.C. or the necessity to find 
that Beckstead acted in a frivolous manner in initiating the action as required under $ 12-121, I.C. 
The City claims the sum of $7,717.50 in attorney fees. Said sum was fully accounted for in 
the Motion and Memorandum of Costs and Attorney Fees submitted by the City, as well as in its 
Memorandum in Support of Costs and Attorney Fees (R., Vol. 2, pp. 3 13-324). The district court's 
decision denying these fees should be reversed and the Court should award said fees to the City. 
Attorney fees should have also been awarded by the district court pursuant to $12-1 17 and 
512-121, Idaho Code. 
The provisions of $12-1 17, I.C. require a court to award the prevailing party reasonable 
attorney fees and costs if the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable 
basis in fact or law. While the provisions of $12-120, I.C., should mandate the award of attorney 
fees, the Court may also rely upon $ 12-1 17, I.C. to award fees. The only question that the court has 
to determine under this section is whether Beckstead acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law. 
The provisions of the ordinance upon which Beckstead relied were explicit. Beclcstead had 
to make a preliminary request to the City that he wished to be reimbursed for his construction costs. 
The same would be submitted to the City, and the City would cause competitive bids to be obtained. 
Beckstead never made the City aware of his request that he wanted to be reimbursed, although fully 
aware ofhis costs at the time of construction. Beckstead waited one year before he notified the City 
through his letter of October 22, 2004, that he wanted to meet with the City to discuss 
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reimbursement. Thus, the court ruled that Beckstead had failed to comply with the provisions of the 
Ordinance, and had further failedto comply with the notice of claim provisions. Beckstead was fully 
aware that he had not complied with the Ordinance or the notice provisions in that Beckstead's 
attorney submitted aNotice of Claim in 2006, nearly three years later. There was no reasonable basis 
of fact or law upon which Beckstead could have relied in bringing his claim. Thus, the City is 
entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs based upon $ 12-1 17, Idaho Code. 
$12-121, LC. allows an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party. This code section 
is limited by Rule 54(e)(l), I.R.C.P. which requires the court to determine whether Beckstead 
brought or pursued his claim frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. For the reasons set 
forth in the City's argument for award of attorney fees under $12-1 17, I.C. the City contends that 
Beckstead's claim was frivolous and without foundation. Failure to comply with the Ordinance, and 
failure to timely file a Notice of Claim, precluded Beckstead from proceeding with his action. To 
have pursued it, regardless of the Ordinance or failure to timely file Notice of Claim, is frivolous and 
unreasonable. 
CONCLUSION 
Becksted sought city approval for a subdivision within Preston, Idaho. In order to construct 
the same, Beckstead had to have adequate fire flow for his subdivision. The Franklill County Fire 
District denied approval unless Beckstead replaced an existing four inch line with a new six inch 
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line. The city requested oversizing to a twelve inch line, and Beckstead constructed the line in 
October, 2003. The City paid Beckstead for the oversizing. He was fully aware of his costs for 
constructing the same by November, 2003. Prior to constructing the line, Beckstead never invoked 
ordinance 16.28.030B by advising the City that he wished to take advantage of that ordinance. As 
the City was unaware of Beckstead wanting to be reimbursed, it did not call for competitive bids, 
verify the competitive bids, collect the bid price from Beckstead, prepare drawings showing 
benefitted properties, or enter into an agreement with Beckstead to define the commencement and 
termination dates of the agreement, the properties benefitted, and the amounts to be collected by the 
City from each intervening connection. As Beckstead had failed to invoke the ordinance, there were 
no duties imposed upon the City, and the decision of the district court should be affirmed. 
The city has not been unjustly enriched, as the requirement to construct the line was imposed 
by the Franklin County Fire District, not the City. None of the money received by the City would 
have reimbursed Becksted. Instead, it was received only for the purpose of reimbursing the City's 
cost in making connections. Beckstead, who received the benefit of the waterline and the fire flow 
that it provided to his twenty-two lot subdivision, is the true beneficiary of his labors. The only 
unjust enrichment that would result would be that to Beckstead ifhe were permitted to be reimbursed 
from the City coffers. In addition thereto, Beckstead failed to file a notice of claim alleging unjust 
enrichment. By his failure to file notice ofthat claim, he is denied the right to recover. 
Beckstead failed to file a timely notice of claim. Beckstead's first claim was actually filed 
on July 31, 2006. As he knew of his construction costs in November, 2003, he was required to 
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submit a claim against the City by May, 2004. His only communication with the City in regard to 
reimbursement prior to his notice of claim of July 3 1,2006, was the letter to the City of October 22, 
2004. This letter was filed with the City more than 180 days after he had completed constructiou 
and knew of his costs. 
The letter of October 22,2004, should not be construed to constitute aclaim pursuant to the 
provisions of 56-907, Idaho Code. It fails to set forth the criteria required by that statute, and 
specifically fails to set forth any amount of damages or make claim for payment of the same. The 
only communicatioii with the City which does set forth an amount of damages and a claim for 
payment of the same is the Notjce of Claim of July 3 1,2006. 
As aresult of Beckstead's failure to invoke the ordinance or to timely submit aclaim, the City 
has been misled to its injury. All connections were made prior to Beckstead's letter of October 22, 
2004. All fees, which were merely reimbursement to the City for its costs, had been collected. If 
payment were required, it would be made from tax revenues of the City, and not from additional fees 
received from intervening connections. 
The district court erred in failing to award the City its attorney fees. 5 12-120, I. C., requires 
the payment of attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party when the action is one for less than 
$25,000.00. Beckstead's claim was for less than this sum, and as the City was the prevailing party, 
it should have been awarded its attorney fees. Furthermore, Beckstead's cause of action, and claims 
are without areasonable basis in fact or law and are frivolous in nature under $512-117 and 12-121, 
LC. The case should be remanded to the district court to determine reasonable attorney fees. 
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The decision of the district. court finding for the City should be affirmed. The decision of the 
district court denying the City its attorney fees should be overruled and the case remanded to 
determine appropriate attorney fees. The City should recover its costs and attorney fees oil appeal. 
Respectfully submitted t h i s d d a y  of April, 2008. 
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